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Book Review 
Reimagining Antitrust: The Revisionist Work 
of Richard S. Markovits 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
ECONOMICS AND THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S.  
 AND E.U. ANTITRUST LAW.  By Richard S. Markovits.  New York, 
New York: Springer.  2014.  1,466 pages.  $258.00. 
Introduction  
Richard Markovits’s antitrust scholarship is nothing if not original and 
provocative, and his new two-volume book is no exception.1  Markovits 
argues forcefully that the Sherman and Clayton Acts were intended to 
employ different tests of illegality.  As a result, even when they cover the 
same practices—such as mergers, exclusive dealing, or tying—they address 
them under different tests.  He then shows how he would analyze various 
practices under the two statutes, discussing virtually every practice that has 
been the subject of significant antitrust litigation.  He also discusses, more 
briefly, the competition law of the European Union.2 
I. The Differences Between the Sherman and Clayton Acts 
In Markovits’s framework for interpreting the antitrust laws, the 
Sherman Act employs a subjective intent test, in some cases combined with 
objective evidence that the intended consequences were achieved or are 
realistically achievable.3  By contrast, the Clayton Act focuses much more 
 
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. 
1. RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, ECONOMICS AND THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF 
U.S. AND E.U. ANTITRUST LAW (2014).  Volume I is subtitled Basic Concepts and Economics-
Based Legal Analyses of Oligopolistic and Predatory Conduct [hereinafter MARKOVITS I].  
Volume II is subtitled Economics-Based Legal Analyses of Mergers, Vertical Practices, and Joint 
Ventures [hereinafter MARKOVITS II]; see Timothy J. Brennan, Ahead of His Time: The Singular 
Contributions of Richard Markovits, 61 ANTITRUST BULL. 109, 109–10 (2016) (discussing 
Markovits’s views). 
2. See Pinar Akman, The Tests of Illegality Under Articles 101 and 102 TEFU, 61 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 84, 84–85 (2016) (discussing Markovits’s views of European Union law). 
3. See MARKOVITS I, supra note 1, at 80–81 (discussing the way that U.S. courts have 
referenced willfulness or intent in the context of the Sherman Act). 
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explicitly on effects.4  As a result, some covered conduct that violates the 
Sherman Act may not violate the Clayton Act, and vice versa.5 
Because the Clayton Act expressly includes effects language, 
Professor Markovits has a relatively easy time arguing that the Clayton Act 
applies an effects-based test.  All three substantive provisions of the 
Clayton Act use similar language, reaching practices “where the effect . . . 
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.”6  
The language of the Sherman Act is more ambiguous, however.  Section 1 
makes “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade” illegal.7  Section 2 condemns “[e]very 
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize.”8 
Markovits is correct that historically most of the intent-based analysis 
under the antitrust laws has emanated from Sherman Act case law, not from 
Clayton Act cases.  For example, subjective intent is not typically an issue 
in a merger case.9  Tying and exclusive-dealing cases can both involve 
discussions of intent, but both tying and exclusive dealing are addressed 
under the Sherman Act as well as the Clayton Act.10  The Clayton Act 
 
4. See id. at 88 (elaborating on how the Clayton Act’s illegality test should focus on the 
effects the act or practice had on customers of the perpetrators and their rivals). 
5. Id. at 97. 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012) (defining price discrimination); see also 15 U.S.C. § 14 
(concerning tying and exclusive dealing); 15 U.S.C. § 18 (concerning mergers). 
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal.  Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any 
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion 
of the court. 
8. 15 U.S.C. § 2: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty 
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion 
of the court. 
9. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957) (noting that 
the Clayton Act’s merger and acquisition provisions may be violated regardless of whether 
anticompetitive effects are intended). 
10. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958) (reasoning that a tying 
provision violated the Sherman Act because “[s]o far as the Railroad was concerned its purpose 
obviously was to fence out competitors, to stifle competition”); Bowen v. N.Y. News, Inc., 522 
F.2d 1242, 1257–58 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that in order to violate the Sherman Act, exclusive 
dealing must be accompanied by monopolistic intent). 
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largely addressed offenses that were not recognized at common law.11  Prior 
to passage of the antitrust laws, corporate mergers were addressed almost 
exclusively under state corporate law, and intent was usually irrelevant.12 
By contrast, the Sherman Act, particularly § 1, is thought to track the 
common law.13  The common law torts of unfair competition and contracts 
in restraint of trade both included heavy doses of intent.14  Even when the 
Sherman Act addressed more novel conduct, however, it focused heavily on 
intent.  Good examples are early antitrust cases involving vertical 
integration, which neither economists nor courts understood very well at  
the time.15  The cases condemning it are replete with discussions of the 
defendants’ intent.16 
In Markovits’s framework, this intent-based formulation for Sherman 
Act offenses requires that the defendants have an ex ante perception that  
the contemplated conduct would be profitable because it would reduce the 
absolute attractiveness of the offers against which the defendant must 
compete.17  Markovits would require this determination as part of the 
plaintiff’s burden of proof, thus making some construction of intent relevant 
in every Sherman Act case, although intent can sometimes be established 
objectively.18  On the latter point, it seems clear that intent experienced a 
diminished role in antitrust as measurement tools became better and as 
antitrust policy began making more neoclassical rational-actor assumptions 
 
11. See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1912) (holding, prior to the Clayton 
Act’s enactment, that the Sherman Act did not reach patent ties), overruled by Motion Picture 
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517–18 (1917) (suggesting that the Clayton 
Act did reach patent ties); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 278–79 (6th Cir. 
1898), modified and aff’d, 175 U.S. 211, 247–48 (1899) (holding that the Sherman Act applied to 
restraints on trade unenforceable at common law so long as they involved interstate commerce). 
12. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937, at 242–43 
(1991) (noting that merger policy at the time largely was left to individual states, which tended not 
to regulate potentially anticompetitive practices within a single firm). 
13. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 1 ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 104 (4th ed. 
2013) (“[T]he framers of the Sherman Act may have thought in some generalized fashion that they 
were ‘enacting’ the common law . . . .”). 
14. Id. ¶ 104b. 
15. Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, Robert Bork and Vertical Integration: Leverage, Foreclosure, 
and Efficiency, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 983, 983–90 (2014). 
16. E.g., United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 182 (1911) (“[T]he acts which 
ensued justify the inference that the intention existed to use the power of the combination as a 
vantage ground to further monopolize the trade in tobacco . . . .”); United States v. Corn Prods. 
Ref. Co., 234 F. 964, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 621 (1919) (“[I]ntent, . . . plays 
so large a part in the decisions of the court in cases of this sort . . . .”); see also FTC v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619, 620 (1927) (considering the Federal Trade Commission Act). 
17. MARKOVITS I, supra note 1, at 77. 
18. Id. at 81, 90. 
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about business-firm behavior.19  As noted below, this has certainly been a 
factor in the law of predatory and other forms of strategic pricing.20 
One problem with intent evidence in antitrust cases is that so many of 
them are private damages actions before juries, and juries are highly likely 
to misinterpret evidence of intent, often exaggerating its role.21  The 
message here is that we should not be condemning the intent itself.  Rather, 
intent is an additional requirement to be placed on top of conduct evidence 
suggesting dangers to competition. 
To see how these differences play out in Markovits’s framework, 
consider unilateral exclusionary conduct, addressed under § 2 of the 
Sherman Act as “monopoliz[ation]” or “attempt to monopolize.”22  
According to Markovits, the offenses of monopolization and attempt to 
monopolize require a showing of “ex ante perpetrator-perceived 
profitability,” in that the conduct in question would deter “rivals from 
making as attractive offers to its perpetrator’s customers as those rivals 
would otherwise have made.”23  Under this definition, predatory conduct 
must be ex ante intended to drive a rival out of business or force it to locate 
further away in product space, or else must involve horizontal mergers or 
acquisitions intended to free the merging parties from competition with one 
another and facilitating oligopolistic or unreasonably exclusionary 
practices.24  By contrast, monopolizing conduct would not include a firm’s 
attempts to improve its own product or reduce its own costs.25  The 
requirement of ex ante perpetrator-perceived profitability could be 
established by subjective evidence, perhaps drawn from the defendant’s 
documents or statements, but it could also be inferred from assessments 
about the actions of a profit-maximizing firm in similar circumstances. 
Neither § 1 nor § 2 of the Sherman Act is specific about the intent that 
is required for illegality or even its relevance, and the judicial decisions 
 
19. See, e.g., PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3A ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 728, 738 
(4th ed. 2015) (explaining the diminished role of intent in exclusionary-pricing cases). 
20. See infra pp. 7–11. 
21. See Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization Analysis, 54 
AM. U. L. REV. 151, 157 (“The main objections to the use of intent evidence are that 
procompetitive intent and anticompetitive intent are supposedly impossible to distinguish, that 
intent evidence is too subjective and unreliable, that juries are prone to misconstrue employees’ 
poor choice of sports and war metaphors for corporate anticompetitive intent, and that the 
presence or absence of intent evidence depends mostly on defendant’s legal sophistication.  These 
problems are all overstated.”). 
22. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 600–58 (4th ed. 2015) (covering monopolization); id. ¶ 800–10 (covering 
attempts to monopolize). 
23. MARKOVITS I, supra note 1, at 70–71. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 70. 
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have not been consistent.26  Whether a contract “restrains trade” for 
purposes of § 1 might easily be measured by considering intent, but it could 
also be measured by a purely objective test, such as whether the contract 
serves to raise prices by reducing output.  The language of § 2 is somewhat 
clearer.  The word “monopolize” seems to contemplate subjectively 
intentional conduct.  As Judge Hand wrote in his important Alcoa27 decision 
in 1945, “no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing.”28  
Only a page earlier in the same opinion, however, he stated, “We disregard 
any question of ‘intent.’”29  Judge Hand was strongly influenced by Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., whose many contributions to American legal 
thought included elaboration and defense of the “external standard,” or the 
idea that conduct should be evaluated not by prying into someone’s 
subjective mind but rather by looking at the naturally expected 
consequences of one’s acts.30  Nevertheless, in his Swift31 opinion in 1905, 
Justice Holmes himself defined the offense of attempt to monopolize as 
requiring both the intent to bring monopoly to pass, and a dangerous 
probability that monopoly would result from the challenged conduct.32  
Speaking of attempt to monopolize under § 2, Judge Hand’s Alcoa decision 
required “specific intent.”33  When interpreting § 1 of the Sherman Act in a 
criminal case, in 1913, the Supreme Court also required specific intent.34  It 
additionally held, however, that the conspirators “must be held to have 
intended the necessary and direct consequences of their acts.”35  In 1966, 
the Supreme Court defined the monopolization offense with intent as an 
element, requiring market power as well as the “willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power as distinguished from [the power’s] growth  
or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, 
or historic accident.”36 
The appropriate role of intent has been particularly problematic in 
cases alleging predatory and other forms of strategic pricing.  Under today’s 
 
26. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012) (emphasizing the illegality of monopolization, but not 
specifying the type of intent required). 
27. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
28. Id. at 432. 
29. Id. at 431. 
30. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 134 (1881) (“The standard of what is called intent 
is thus really an external standard of conduct under the known circumstances . . . .”); id. at 137 
(noting that the law “works out an external standard of what would be fraudulent in the average 
prudent member of the community, and requires every member at his peril to avoid that”).  On 
Holmes’ influence on Hand, see GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 
137–38 (2d ed. 2011) (speaking of Hand’s “admiration, even idolatry, of Holmes” as “extreme”). 
31. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). 
32. Id. at 396. 
33. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 432. 
34. United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1913). 
35. Id. 
36. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
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standards, the plaintiff must show a price below a relevant measure of cost 
and a market structure such that a reasonable person in the defendant’s 
position at the onset of the predatory campaign could predict profitable 
recoupment of the predation investment.37  One might say that this standard 
makes intent irrelevant.  More plausibly, however, it assumes that the 
defendant is a rational, profit-maximizing actor and infers intent from that 
premise.  Brooke Group,38 the leading Supreme Court case on the issue, 
was not brought under § 2 of the Sherman Act where predatory pricing law 
chiefly resides, but rather under § 2 of the Clayton Act, amended in 1936 by 
the Robinson–Patman Act.39  That statute uses the purely objective 
language “where the effect . . . may be substantially to lessen 
competition.”40  The so-called “primary line” application of that statute, 
which is applied to predatory pricing, is based on language from the 
original 1914 Clayton Act, not from its 1936 amendments.41  Under 
Markovits’s analysis, intent would not be relevant.  
Historically, the Supreme Court had made anticompetitive intent 
central to antitrust analysis of unilateral pricing, even under the Clayton Act 
provision.  For example, its Utah Pie42 decision in 1967 focused heavily on 
intent.43  The Brooke Group majority did an about-face on that issue, 
however, concluding that “whatever its intent” may have been, illegality 
depended on below-cost pricing and a structural market analysis of the 
likelihood of recoupment.44  Indeed, the district court had found evidence of 
anticompetitive intent “more voluminous and detailed than any other 
reported case.”45  In its subsequent Weyerhaeuser46 decision, which 
involved alleged predatory purchasing, the Court read the same standards 
into § 2 of the Sherman Act, never even discussing intent.47 
Markovits’s distinction between the Sherman and Clayton Acts is also 
consistent with the fact that the Sherman Act is simultaneously criminal and 
civil, while the Clayton Act is only civil, although with one interesting and 
 
37. See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, ¶¶ 720–49 (discussing issues 
surrounding strategic and predatory pricing). 
38. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
39. Id. at 216. 
40. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012). 
41. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, at ¶ 745e. 
42. Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). 
43. Id. at 696–97, 696 n.12 (applying an intent test to find unlawful predation under the 
Robinson–Patman Act). 
44. Brooke, 509 U.S. at 232. 
45. Id. at 248 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Liggett Grp., Inc. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 748 F. Supp. 344, 354 (M.D.N.C. 1990)). 
46. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312 (2007). 
47. Id. at 318–20. 
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largely defunct exception.48  Section 2a of the Robinson–Patman Act made 
it a criminal offense to employ price discrimination “for the purpose of 
destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor.”49  That provision, 
unlike all others in the Clayton Act, includes intent language.  It is not 
enforceable by private parties, but only by the government.50  In any event, 
the government has not enforced it in a half century.51 
One historically frustrating thing about the Sherman Act is that it 
defines unlawful conduct in sweeping, nonspecific terms, stating that this 
conduct is a felony.52  Then, in a separate provision (originally § 7 of the 
Sherman Act, but today § 4 of the Clayton Act),53 the statute additionally 
makes this offense a civil violation, enforceable by private plaintiffs 
through treble damages actions.54  Whatever the requirement of a civil 
provision, felonies have an independent mens rea requirement, as the 
Supreme Court required for criminal antitrust prosecutions in 1978.55  This 
makes an intent requirement essential for criminal liability. 
Markovits argues that the Sherman Act covers all manner of business 
conduct with one exception: namely, § 1 does not cover attempts to enter 
into anticompetitive agreements.56  As he observes, § 1 does not contain an 
explicit attempt offense, while § 2 does condemn attempts to monopolize, 
although not attempts to conspire to monopolize.57  Of course, this 
distinction might be unimportant to the extent that an attempt to enter into 
an anticompetitive agreement might also be characterized as an attempt to 
 
48. Hugh C. Hansen, Robinson-Patman Law: A Review and Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1113, 1174–82 (1983) (describing the disinclination of both the Federal Trade Commission and 
the Department of Justice to enforce the Robinson–Patman Act in recent years). 
49. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (2012): 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to sell, or contract to sell, goods in any part of 
the United States at prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the 
United States for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor 
in such part of the United States; or, to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably 
low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.  
Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction 
thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 
50. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 376 (1958). 
51. 14 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW  ¶ 2364 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that there have 
been no actions since the late 1960s) . 
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3. 
53. 15 U.S.C. § 15. 
54. Id.  In addition, 15 U.S.C. § 26 grants equity relief to private plaintiffs “against threatened 
loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws.” 
55. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978); see also PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 2 ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 303c3 (4th ed. 2014) (“The Supreme 
Court’s Gypsum decision held that mens rea must be separately established for a criminal antitrust 
offense.”). 
56. MARKOVITS I, supra note 1, at 75. 
57. Id. 
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monopolize.  In the well-known American Airlines58 case, Robert L. 
Crandall, American’s president, telephoned Howard Putnam, president of 
Braniff Airlines, proposing that they fix ticket prices into and out of the 
Dallas–Fort Worth (DFW) airport.59  Unbeknownst to Crandall, Putnam 
was recording the conversation, which he then turned over to the Justice 
Department.60  The Fifth Circuit found that this solicitation, even though 
unaccepted, constituted an attempt to monopolize.  The court noted that if 
the solicitation had succeeded, the cartel, rather than each firm individually, 
would dominate the DFW market.61  The court also made clear, however, 
that this attempt to form a cartel was not to be construed as an attempt 
offense under § 1 of the Sherman Act, but rather as an attempt to 
monopolize, expressly covered by § 2.62  Professor Markovits agrees with 
that analysis, concluding that attempts to form cartels are reachable under 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, but not § 1.63 
II. Antitrust’s Sherman Act Tests for Exclusionary Pricing 
Professor Markovits’s approach to the Sherman Act often makes the 
legislation a more aggressive tool than the law has interpreted it to be 
today.64  For example, under his analysis, so-called limit pricing, which is 
generally above-cost pricing intended either to exclude higher cost rivals or 
limit their growth, is a challengeable form of exclusionary pricing.65  The 
antitrust case law today insists that an unlawful predatory price be one 
below a relevant measure of cost, typically marginal cost or average 
variable cost.66  As a general matter, Markovits believes that predatory 
pricing is a far more plausible strategy than much of the literature today, as 
 
58. United States v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984). 
59. Id. at 1116. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 1118, 1122. 
62. Id. at 1117. 
63. MARKOVITS I, supra note 1, at 502. 
64. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, Comments on Richard Markovits’ Claim That the 
Requirement of Possession of Pre or Post Market Power Is Unnecessary in Monopolization and 
Attempt to Monopolize Cases and a Proposed Second-Best Reconciliation of the Per Se and 
Conventional Approaches to Dangerous Probability, 61 ANTITRUST BULL. 155, 157 (2016) 
(“[T]he gist of [Professor Markovits’s] disagreement with conventional views of Section 2 are that 
(1) successful single firm anticompetitive conduct does not require the possession of market 
power at the outset and (2) the failure to achieve market power is not an indication that efforts did 
not manifest specific anticompetitive intent and should not be condemned under Section 2.”); 
Keith N. Hylton, Markovits on Defining Monopolization: A Comment, 61 ANTITRUST BULL. 105, 
105–08 (2016) (describing Markovits’s definition of monopolization). 
65. MARKOVITS I, supra note 1, at 517–18. 
66. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, ¶¶ 735, 740. 
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well as current Supreme Court case law, maintains.67  For example, limit 
pricing is customarily achieved by scale economies that permit a dominant 
firm to exclude smaller rivals while nevertheless keeping its own prices 
above its costs, or else by carrying excess capacity in such a way that it can 
threaten a steep price cut in response to rival entry.68  As such, limit pricing 
is a sustainable strategy that might be profitable even if carried on 
indefinitely.  Predatory pricing law today does not condemn such behavior.  
Rather, it requires prices below a relevant measure of cost, thus making the 
strategy nonsustainable.69  The principal obstacle to using antitrust to 
pursue above-cost limit pricing is thought to be limitations on the fact-
finding power of courts, which generally lack the tools to identify when 
above-cost prices are anticompetitive.70  Determining when a price that is 
above cost is unreasonably exclusionary is far more difficult than 
determining when a price is lower than cost.  Under a cost-based standard, 
one need only identify and compute relevant costs.  In order to identify 
above-cost prices as anticompetitive, however, we must know something 
about the shape of the demand curve facing the dominant firm and the 
impact of a particular limit price on rival decision making.71 
III. Relevant Markets and Market Definition 
Markovits also rejects the law’s current requirement of firm 
dominance of a relevant market, finding the correlation between structural 
firm dominance and potentially harmful incidents of predatory pricing to be 
“extremely low and weak.”72  He also rejects the conventional conclusion 
that successful predation can occur only in markets subject to high entry 
barriers.73  These conclusions are consistent with his belief that market 
 
67. MARKOVITS I, supra note 1, at 265, 519–30, 563 (discussing, inter alia, Frank 
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981), and 
John McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958)). 
68. For a good survey of the many alternative models, see Robert E. Hall, Potential 
Competition, Limit Pricing, and Price Elevation from Exclusionary Conduct, in 1 ABA SECTION 
OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 433, 434–40 (2008). 
69. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–25 
(1993) (establishing that pricing below an appropriate measure of the producer’s cost is a 
necessary element of predatory pricing). 
70. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, ¶¶ 736–37, 741. 
71. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Areeda–Turner Test for Exclusionary Pricing: A Critical 
Journal, 46 REV. INDUS. ORG. 209, 217–19 (2015) (explaining the need to determine rival costs 
and market properties); Abraham L. Wickelgren, The Necessary Complexity of Predatory Pricing 
Analysis: A Comment on Richard S. Markovits’s Treatment of Predatory Pricing in Economics 
and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law, 61 ANTITRUST BULL. 186, 
186–97 (2016) (discussing tests for predatory pricing). 
72. MARKOVITS I, supra note 1, at 528. 
73. Id. at 528–29 (commenting primarily on Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A 
Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979)). 
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definition is inevitably arbitrary.74  Rather, a firm’s ability to engage 
profitably in predation depends on the number and nature of situations in 
which it is a better placed competitor than others.  Firms often operate in a 
number of such situations, which are really buyer–seller pairs, rather than in 
a single conventional market.75  The real question for Markovits is the 
number of such situations and the degree of advantage that the firm in 
question has with respect to its own product offering. 
The rise of “unilateral effects” analysis in merger policy is more 
consistent with Markovits’s approach, for it acknowledges that competition 
is much more intense between relatively proximate firms in product space 
than any overall “relevant market” as defined by conventional antitrust 
tools.76  If mergers between relatively adjacent firms that comprise a small 
subset of a traditionally defined relevant market can lead to harmful price 
increases, it would seem to follow that unreasonably exclusionary pricing in 
the same setting could do so as well. 
In general, Markovits is highly critical of the “market definition” 
requirement that has dominated antitrust law since the middle of the 
twentieth century and that today controls all Sherman Act cases under the 
rule of reason, all unilateral practice cases, and nearly everything under the 
Clayton Act except for cases brought under the Robinson–Patman Act and 
some unilateral effects merger cases.77 
There is much to be said for Markovits’s position, particularly in 
situations where antitrust law attempts to group sales that are differentiated 
in product or geographic space into a single market.  The case that most 
damaged our understanding of market power and market definition was 
Judge Hand’s 1945 Alcoa decision—mainly because of its highly influential 
reorientation of structural considerations around the concept of a “relevant 
market,” eventually elaborated into a “relevant product market” and 
 
74. MARKOVITS I, supra note 1, at 165–67.  For further development, see chapters 6 and 7 of 
Markovits’s book in their entireties; Rupprecht Podszun, The Arbitrariness of Market Definition 
and an Evolutionary Concept of Markets, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 121 (2016); and Daniel Zimmer, 
The Emancipation of Antitrust from Market-Share-Based Approaches, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 133 
(2016). 
75. MARKOVITS I, supra note 1, at 257–58. 
76. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 913 (Supp. 2015). 
77. See, e.g., MARKOVITS I, supra note 1, at 165 (introducing a chapter with a “general 
criticism that can be made of all [market definition] approaches” and referring the reader to 
Volume II of his work for further examples of the flaws of the market approach and requirement); 
Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic 
Alternative to Market Definition, B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON., Jan. 2010, art. 9, 1, 4–6 (2010) 
(arguing that the market definition inquiry only indirectly addresses whether a merger is 
anticompetitive and fails to fit well with the economic way of thinking); Louis Kaplow, Why 
(Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 503 (2010) (noting that market definition “plays 
a central but unnecessary and affirmatively misleading role in evaluating horizontal mergers”). 
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“relevant geographic market.”78  This approach was consistent with the 
emergent economic and antitrust structuralism of the day, which placed a 
heavy emphasis on market structure as assessed by market concentration 
(the number of firms in a relevant market and their size dispersion), as well 
as entry barriers, and de-emphasized conduct.79  The structuralist approach 
generally assessed market concentration by summing the market shares of 
the firms in a market, whether differentiated or not.80  As Edward S. Mason, 
a leading founder of antitrust structuralism, wrote in the late 1930s, while 
lawyers tend to see monopoly in terms of intent and conduct, economists 
tend to see it in terms of market control.81 
Among the product market definition claims that Hand addressed was 
the district court’s conclusion that the relevant market included both 
“virgin” and “secondary” aluminum.82  Virgin aluminum, the only kind that 
Alcoa made, was smelted out of original inputs into aluminum ingot, which 
was then supplied to fabricators.83  By contrast, “secondary” aluminum, 
produced by seventeen smaller companies, was reclaimed from old 
aluminum products that had been discarded, as well as the floor cuttings 
that aluminum fabricators left behind.84  The most important difference 
between virgin and secondary ingot was that it was often difficult or 
impossible to determine the particular alloy, or combination of materials, in 
secondary aluminum.85  By contrast, virgin aluminum was made to 
specification.86  As a result, secondary aluminum was unacceptable for 
manufacturers of sensitive aluminum parts that required high performance 
standards respecting heat or torque, such as airplane components.87  
Secondary aluminum was perfectly good, however, for such things as 
kitchen cookware for which any alloy was acceptable.88 
 
78. Richard G. Price, Note, Market Power and Monopoly Power in Antitrust Analysis, 75 
CORNELL L. REV. 190, 193 n.11 (1989) (“By far the most common method of assessing a firm’s 
market power or monopoly power is to examine its share of the properly defined product market. 
In probably the most famous example of the use of market share, Judge Hand ruled in United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. that a market share of over ninety percent would be sufficient to 
support a finding of monopoly.  Since that time, courts have used market share to determine if a 
firm has either monopoly power or market power.” (citation omitted)). 
79. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE § 1.7 (5th ed. 2016). 
80. On the development and collapse of structuralism, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE 
OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 206–19 (2015). 
81. Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34, 34–36 (1937). 
82. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945). 
83. Id. at 423–25. 
84. Id. at 423. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. See id. (highlighting the airplane and cable fabricators’ insistence on virgin aluminum). 
88. Id. 
HOVENKAMP.TOPRINTER 5/2/2016  6:50 PM 
1232 Texas Law Review [Vol. 94:1221 
The virgin/secondary issue created a rather unusual instance of product 
differentiation in production terms, although it was quite conventional in 
economic terms.  The two products competed with one another for many 
customers, but different customers had different preferences depending on 
their needs, and some of the preferences were very strong.  Nevertheless, 
the choice the district court posed and Judge Hand accepted was purely 
binary: the two products were either in the same market or else they were 
not.89  Putting them in the same market, as the district court did, meant that 
they would be treated as perfectly competitive with each other—a 
conclusion expressed by simply summing the output of the two in order to 
compute a market share.90  By contrast, excluding secondary, as Judge 
Hand’s opinion did, meant that secondary would be treated as if it did not 
compete with virgin aluminum at all.91  The first choice understated Alcoa’s 
power while the second choice exaggerated it. 
The Alcoa decision more or less set the stage for further development 
of market definition in differentiated markets.  For example, the du Pont92  
(cellophane) case a few years later considered whether the relevant market 
was du Pont’s cellophane or a broader market of “flexible packaging 
materials,” including plain paper, wax paper, grease paper, metal foils, and 
glassine.93  Many buyers used a variety of packaging, switching from one to 
another, while others had strong preferences for one.94  The technologies of 
production for such alternatives as aluminum foil, grease paper, and 
cellophane differed considerably from one another, as did the inputs used.95  
Nevertheless, the choice was once again presented as binary.  The 
government argued that the relevant market was “cellophane,” giving 
du Pont a dominant share.96  Du Pont argued, and the Supreme Court 
agreed, that the larger market for all flexible packaging materials was the 
correct one, observing the extent of customer substitution. 97 
Once again, both market definitions were clearly wrong as an estimate 
of power.  Including noncellophane flexible packaging materials in the 
same market served to understate du Pont’s power by a wide margin, given 
the cost advantage and strong preferences of some consumers for 
 
89. Id. at 424. 
90. Id. at 423–25. 
91. Id. 
92. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
93. Id. at 394–404. 
94. See id. at 401 (discussing buyers’ changing needs for various flexible wrappings). 
95. Id. at 397. 
96. Id. at 380. 
97. This argument was probably incorrect, as it ignored the fact that high substitution rates at 
current market prices might show only that the defendant was already charging a monopoly price.  
This is commonly known as the “Cellophane fallacy.”  See PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, 2B ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 539 (4th ed. 2014). 
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cellophane.  In Markovits’s terms, cellophane was the best placed product 
for these buyers.  However, completely excluding these materials would 
undoubtedly have exaggerated du Pont’s power to the extent that 
interproduct substitution was significant and a large subset of customers 
seemed to be quite sensitive to price.98  This error was exacerbated by the 
fact that, within this broader “market,” production mobility was very 
difficult.  That is, a firm currently producing aluminum foil could not 
readily reposition its production technology in order to produce higher 
margin cellophane, or vice versa. 
In this area, Markovits was a voice crying in the wilderness for years.99  
Today, the economic case is emerging that market definition is no more 
than a second-best way to assess market power.100  The modern movement 
generally away from conventional market definition and toward a form of 
analysis based on specific measurement of interfirm substitution comes 
closer to Markovits’s analysis.  For example, a great deal of so-called 
“unilateral effects” analysis in merger cases today does not depend on a 
market definition in the traditional sense, although the case law clings to 
market definition terminology.101  This is true not only because of history 
and stare decisis but also because the “line of commerce” and “section of 
the country” language in the antimerger provision, § 7 of the Clayton Act, 
has seemed to many courts to require a market definition.102 
Unilateral effects analysis proceeds by looking at the product-
differentiated firm’s relationships with its various competitors, focusing on 
 
98. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 400 (agreeing with the district court’s conclusion 
that the “‘sensitivity of customers in the flexible packaging markets to price or quality changes’ 
prevented du Pont from possessing monopoly control over price” (citing United States v. E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp 41, 207 (D. Del. 1953))). 
99. Richard S. Markovits, A Response to Professor Posner, 28 STAN. L. REV. 919, 949 (1976) 
(“Professor Posner’s assumption that a firm can prove that it enjoys substantial competitive 
advantages by showing that it possesses a substantial share of a carefully defined market manifests 
his refusal to deal with the realities of monopolistic competition.  As we have seen, the concept of 
a ‘careful market definition’ is often inherently contradictory: under conditions of monopolistic 
competition, it often is impossible to define markets in anything but an arbitrary way.  In fact, 
even if markets could be defined nonarbitrarily, market shares and competitive advantages might 
not be highly correlated.  Thus, the only firm to make any American sales of a product that has no 
close substitutes would still have virtually no competitive advantages if a foreign competitor were 
only slightly worse placed to obtain the patronage of the relevant buyers or if a domestic producer 
of another good who could quickly switch his production to the good concerned would be only 
slightly worse placed to obtain the sales in question.”). 
100. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 77, at 440 (stating his desire to abandon the market 
definition process for assessing market power). 
101. See, e.g., Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 77, at 1; Steven C. Salop, The Evolution and 
Vitality of Merger Presumptions: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 276–
77 (2015). 
102. E.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 491 (1974) (discussing which 
markets are relevant); FTC v. Whole Foods Mkts., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(rejecting the FTC’s market definition); see also Salop, supra note 101, at 324 (illustrating 
disputes over market definitions). 
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those that are closest by in product space.103  Applying a version of 
monopolistic-competition theory, Markovits’s important opening 
proposition is that every market is differentiated.104  Even firms that make 
fungible commodities are differentiated in space.  As a result, the time and 
cost of shipment differentiates them from their rivals.105  As Piero Sraffa 
once observed, what we think of as markets are better conceived of as 
differentiated segments.106  Within each of these arbitrarily defined regions, 
a particular firm may have an advantage in comparison to others in the 
same region.107 
In conventional manufacturing markets, differentiation is frequently 
obvious, notwithstanding the tendency of antitrust tribunals to treat 
products as perfectly fungible for purposes of market definition.108  By 
contrast, unilateral effects analysis considers whether firms are closer or 
more remote than competitors and that pricing pressures reflect responses to 
one’s more immediate rivals.109  Or, to say it differently, cartel-like 
decisions need not be market wide. 
The best known historical illustration is Harold Hotelling’s model 
portraying competitors as arrayed along a line at various distances from the 
customer.110  For example, imagine a number of hot dog stands 
 
103. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 4 ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 914 (4th ed. 2016). 
104. In particular, see Richard S. Markovits, An Ideal Antitrust Law Regime, 64 TEXAS L. 
REV. 251, 253, 255–66 (1985) (delineating “and then reject[ing] the traditional argument for the 
conclusion that procompetition policies always increase allocative efficiency [and] analyz[ing] the 
allocative efficiency of antitrust policies in a sophisticated way that takes into consideration both 
the general theory of second best and the fact that antitrust can affect allocative efficiency not only 
by altering the competitiveness of the economy but also by increasing various affected businesses’ 
organizational allocative efficiency”); Richard S. Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A 
Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 41, 43, 44–48 (1984) (articulating the tests that 
Markovits thinks the Sherman and Clayton Acts contain and briefly explaining how “the courts 
should analyze the legality of different types of practices under the American antitrust laws”). 
105. As a result, Markovits is severely critical of the Merger Guidelines approach to 
conventional market definition.  MARKOVITS I, supra note 1, at 190–210. 
106. Piero Sraffa, The Laws of Returns Under Competitive Conditions, 36 ECON. J. 535, 544–
49 (1926) (speaking of buyer preferences and noting that “[w]hen each of the firms producing a 
commodity is in such a position the general market for the commodity is subdivided into a series 
of distinct markets”). 
107. Id. (discussing causes of buyer preferences for one firm over another, placing the latter at 
a relative disadvantage as to that customer). 
108. See, e.g., Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law, 2010 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1425, 1461 (analyzing differentiation among brands); Paul Krugman, The 
Increasing Returns Revolution in Trade and Geography, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 564 (2009) 
(explaining the typical assumptions made regarding differentiated products within a 
manufacturing market); Richard Schmalensee, Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering 
Brands, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 349–50 (1982) (analyzing how product differentiation and 
market entry affects market performance). 
109. See AREEDA &  HOVENKAMP, supra note 103, ¶ 914. 
110. Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41, 45 (1929); see Steven C. 
Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, 10 BELL J. ECON. 141, 142–43 (1979) 
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approximately one hundred feet apart on a beach.  Sunbathers can walk to 
any stand they choose, but prefer shorter walks to longer ones.  As a result, 
each stand is better placed with respect to some sunbathers than others.  
Each stand’s relative strength depends on such factors as the density of 
sunbathers in its proximity, as well as the distance to the next closest stands.  
Some sunbathers may lie equidistant between two stands and are thus in 
greater competitive play than a sunbather who is, say, thirty feet from the 
stand to his left and seventy feet from the stand to his right.  For any 
particular customer, a stand that is one hundred feet away will have an 
advantage over a stand that is two hundred feet away, and an even greater 
advantage over one that is three hundred feet away. 
Beginning with this insight, so-called unilateral effects in merger 
analysis suggests that a merger of two relatively adjacent stands is likely to 
have a more significant impact on the market price than a merger of two 
stands that are more widely separated from one another, such as the first 
and the fourth stand along the line.  This is so because the merger of two 
adjacent stands makes a particular sunbather’s second choice less attractive, 
given that the two adjacent stands have now become one.  As a result, the 
new second choice was previously the third choice.  At that point, we can 
model the price impact by considering such things as the extent to which 
customers in fact preferred the acquired firm as an alternative prior to the 
merger and the extent to which they will divert to their third or fourth 
choice.  The theory works even if the two merging firms are not the closest 
possible rivals, although they have to be relatively close. 
Richard Markovits’s pioneering work in this area has been noted and 
appreciated by some of the formal developers of unilateral effects 
analysis.111  He has not received the attention he deserves, however, largely 
because his nomenclature is so different from that which is used today.112  
Nonetheless, the more fundamental question Markovits’s line of analysis 
suggests has acquired increasing importance: namely, while the rise of 
“relevant market” analysis in mid-twentieth-century antitrust law was 
ground shifting, it may also have been a serious misstep to the extent that its 
binary approach to market delineation inevitably under- or over-states 
market power. 
The rise of unilateral effects theory has made the idea of assessing 
market power without market definition acceptable in some portions of 
 
(relating competition to the extent of differences among individual firms and modelling them as 
arrayed around a circle). 
111. E.g., David T. Levy & James D. Reitzes, The Importance of Localized Competition in 
the 1992 Merger Guidelines: How Closely Do Merging Firms Compete, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 695, 
697 n.10 (1994); Gregory J. Werden, Simulating the Effects of Differentiated Products Mergers: A 
Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 370 n.35 (1997). 
112. Ian Ayres, A Private Revolution: Markovits and Markets, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 861, 
861–62 (1988) (providing a glossary of terms coined and used by Markovits). 
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merger policy today.  Bringing it to other areas of antitrust law is likely to 
be a tougher sell.  For example, the Supreme Court has insisted that relevant 
markets be defined in Sherman Act § 2 cases,113 as well as for § 1 cases 
under the rule of reason.114  No lower court today would be likely to find 
traditional market definition unnecessary in those areas without new 
Supreme Court guidance.  The same thing is very likely true for tying or 
exclusive-dealing cases requiring assessment of market foreclosure.115 
Nevertheless, one fact seems inescapable: if the logic of unilateral 
effects analysis applies to mergers—concluding that the union of adjacent 
competitors harms competition—then it should apply equally to other 
antitrust practices that serve to eliminate or blunt competition between 
reasonably adjacent firms.  For example, a firm that predates its closest rival 
into bankruptcy may be able to induce a unilateral price increase just as 
much as the survivor of a merger between these same two firms.  Indeed, 
the industrial-organization literature often treats merger and predation as 
alternative ways of eliminating a rival, or predatory pricing as a precursor to 
merger.116  Structurally, the two practices might amount to the same thing: 
eliminating one of the two firms.  The same thing could be said of 
disciplinary price cutting directed against a firm’s close rival in product 
space, intended not to destroy it but rather to encourage it to raise its prices 
back to a more accommodating level.  Brooke Group itself involved such 
claims.117  The defendant was a nondominant firm with only 11%–12% of a 
conventionally defined market.118  The Supreme Court did not dismiss the 
complaint on that basis, however, but rather because in its judgment 
profitable recoupment of the investment in predation was not shown to be 
objectively likely.119  The same thing could also be true of tying or 
exclusive dealing intended to deny a relatively close rival access to a 
 
113. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993). 
114. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (requiring that antitrust plaintiffs show 
that a particular contract is in fact anticompetitive and reserving per se rules for agreements that 
are so plainly uncompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed); NCAA v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 111–12 & n.48 (1984) (reviewing and approving the 
district court’s market definition and analysis of whether college football broadcasts constitute a 
separate market). 
115. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) (holding that 
applying § 3 of the Clayton Act to an exclusive-dealing arrangement requires a court to determine 
carefully the area of effective competition and analyze a threatened foreclosure of competition in 
relation to the market affected). 
116. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 374–76 (1988) 
(citing situations involving American Tobacco Company and Standard Oil Company as two 
famous examples of corporations that engaged in predatory pricing before acquisitions of 
competitors or mergers). 
117. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 230–31 (1993). 
118. Id. at 228. 
119. Id. at 230–32. 
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market, as well as loyalty discounts.120  All of these could be used in 
differentiated markets to exclude reasonably proximate rivals.  Further, it is 
no answer to say that a practice affecting only two firms is de minimis.  
Such firms may be very large, while in other situations an entire relevant 
market as used in conventional antitrust analysis might be very small. 
Ironically, giving legal recognition to the problem of eliminating 
competition in unilateral effects mergers while denying recognition in cases 
involving more exclusionary antitrust practices such as predatory pricing or 
exclusive contracting gives firms the incentive to employ the pricing or 
contractual-exclusion strategies rather than merger.  One perverse result 
may be that the elimination of competition will occur, but without the 
offsetting efficiencies that at least some mergers can provide. 
Economists generally find it much easier to accommodate these 
conceptual shifts than lawyers and judges do, largely because of the strong 
value that law places on precedent and the relative infrequency of Supreme 
Court decision making in specific antitrust areas.  In addition, the tools we 
have developed for unilateral effects analysis of mergers in product-
differentiated markets are more revisionist than would be required for 
Sherman Act § 2 cases, although they could easily have some application to 
analysis of joint ventures under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Finally, the expansion of § 2 liability to product-differentiated firms 
considered to be nondominant under conventional analysis would result in a 
much bigger investment in antitrust and very likely in serious challenges to 
the fact-finding power of courts.  Traditional market definition 
methodologies have been made at least superficially more accessible to 
juries than approaches that require direct measurement of residual demand.  
Private damages actions continue to account for the great bulk of federal 
civil antitrust cases aside from mergers.  Significantly, unilateral effects 
merger analysis appears almost exclusively in government equity 
proceedings (Antitrust Division) or administrative proceedings (Federal 
Trade Commission), where juries are not used.121  As a result, whatever the 
merits of the change, one should not expect courts to drop market-definition 
and market-share measures in antitrust cases anytime soon. 
  
 
120. See, e.g., McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 823–24 (11th Cir. 2015) (affirming FTC 
findings that a dominant firm used an exclusive-dealing arrangement to maintain monopoly power 
by making it prohibitively expensive for its customers to switch distributors). 
121. Steven R. Gilford, Comment, The Constitutional Rights to Trial by Jury and 
Administrative Imposition of Money Penalties, 1976 DUKE L.J. 723, 723–24. 
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Conclusion 
One of the things that has made Markovits’s revisionism a tough sell is 
its completeness.  His work has substituted a whole new vocabulary and 
way of thinking about competition, taking differentiation as a given and 
focusing on best placed and less well-placed competitors.  One impact of 
this is to make anticompetitive practices plausible under conditions when 
traditional market definition suggests that the firms in question lack 
sufficient power.  To that extent Markovits’s analysis, if accepted, may lead 
to a significant expansion of antitrust enforcement.  Nevertheless, it may 
very well lie in antitrust policy’s future. 
 
